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Abstract 
In the last decade, Colombia has seen improvement in the levels of violence and the stability of 
the state as a result of targeting illicit narcotics traffickers. In the same period, Mexico has seen 
an increase in violence and the destabilisation of the state as a result of targeting illicit narcotics 
traffickers. 
 
This thesis will fill an important gap in the literature and answer the question of why Mexico’s 
policies failed while Colombia’s have succeeded.  
 
The answer will be presented in three parts. The first will explore physical geography, 
establishing its importance in illicit narcotics trafficking. The second part is state stability, which 
has an effect on how successfully policy is implemented. The independent and final variable is 
policy orientation.  
 
This thesis argues that the policy orientations pursued in Colombia and Mexico played on the 
geography and state stability of each state to produce radically different effects on violenc
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Introduction 
In the early 2000s, Colombia was on the verge of collapse. It was considered a rapidly failing, if 
not failed, state on the path to becoming a fully-fledged narco-state (Harding, 1998). At the same 
time, Mexico had just successfully and peacefully transitioned to democracy after a 70-year 
authoritarian regime (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). Both countries, despite these 
differences, were struggling with a similar issue. Colombia and Mexico are both countries with 
major roles in the Latin American illegal drug trade. In Colombia, at the time, huge amounts of 
cocaine were being grown and refined, with groups then trafficking that cocaine through Central 
America into Mexico and the United States. The illegal drug trade in Mexico was also rapidly 
growing, as the distribution potential of the Caribbean was neutralised, and Mexico was 
becoming the country of choice through which to move product into the United States. This 
industry was only becoming more prevalent, as the consumption of illegal drugs in the United 
States of America (“US”) continued to rise and they themselves began to enter an opioid crisis 
(World Drug Report, 2018). Colombia and Mexico both began to pursue policies to deal with the 
illegal drug trade in response to this situation.  
 
Colombia’s homicide rate has dropped dramatically since 2001, from a high of 67 per 100 000 to 
an all-time low of 27 per 100 000 in 2015 (UNODC, 2018). The state is no longer considered to 
be a failed state or even weak state. In 2016, an official cease-fire was reached with the FARC 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), a revolutionary group within Colombia that had 
been part of a civil war that began in the 1960s. Despite the continued proliferation of coca 
growing operations, violence continues to fall (UNODC, 2018).  
 
In the same period, Mexico’s homicide rate has risen from a low of 7 per 100 000 to a historical 
high of 23 per 100 000 (UNODC, 2018). The Mexican War on Drugs has escalated dramatically, 
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with politicians, journalists and civilian casualties increasing each month (Rosen and Zepeda 
Martínez, 2016). Mexican drug cartels conduct war with each other over distribution points 
within Mexico, and show no sign of disappearing despite militarised government policy (Lindo 
and Padilla-Romo, 2018).  
 
Both Colombia and Mexico pursued, at first glance, similar policies to combat the rampancy of 
the illicit drug trade within their countries. The effects of these policies have been in stark 
contrast when it comes to the rate of violence in these countries. Columbia has cut its homicide 
rate by 60% while Mexico’s has risen by 230% over the last [15] years (UNODC, 2018).  
 
The question that this data raises is why Colombia’s policies succeeded in reducing violence 
while Mexico’s similar policies failed so dramatically.  
 
The central argument of this thesis is that Colombia and Mexico pursued different policy 
orientations, and that orientation was the cause of the failure of Mexico’s policies despite 
superficial similarities in the policies themselves. Policy orientation here refers to specific areas 
and methods that influence policies and determine their effectiveness.  
 
This thesis will hold that Colombia’s policy approach was fundamentally interwoven with 
strengthening state stability while at the same time combatting illicit narcotics trafficking. In 
Mexico, however, the state pursued a law enforcement approach that assumed and relied on the 
state remaining stable so that illicit narcotics traffickers could be arrested, tried and prosecuted. 
These differing orientations interacted with the existing physical geography of each state. The 
outcome was opposite effects in terms of violence, despite superficial policy similarities.  
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This argument will unfold over four chapters.  
The first chapter will give a brief history of illicit narcotics trafficking, internationally and then 
specific to Latin America. It will then delve into a brief literature review, and explain the 
methodology.  
 
The second chapter will explore the geography of each state in turn, establishing the importance 
of physical geography in relation to illicit narcotics trafficking and its impact on violence as well 
as the influence on border politics.  
 
The third chapter will explore the differences between Mexico and Colombia in terms of state 
stability at the beginning of the period, which is essential to exploring the effectiveness of their 
implementation of policy.  
 
The final and most important factor is that Colombia and Mexico pursued different policy 
orientations. This will be covered in the fourth chapter. First, it will establish the policies 
introduced in Colombia and how these were affected by geography and state stability. Then it 
will explore Mexico’s policies and how they were negatively impacted by the same variables. 
Finally, the chapter will evaluate the importance of selecting a policy approach to controlling 
illicit narcotics trafficking that caters to the unique characteristics of physical geography and 
state stability, each essential to the operation of illicit narcotics trafficking.  
 
This is an area of great importance, especially given the impact of illicit narcotics trafficking on 
the safety and wellbeing of citizens within the states where it is taking place. It is also important 
given that these policies, if appearing to be successful, will be used elsewhere, and if the reasons 
for their success or failure are not understood then there will be no accuracy in their application. 
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The lack of English-language literature surrounding this topic is extremely important for this 
reason.   
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Chapter 1: Beginnings 
Introduction - Transnational Illicit Narcotics Trafficking in Latin America 
The world of illicit narcotics trafficking is truly a globalised issue in the present era (Kan, 2016). 
It is rare that illicit narcotics are produced, moved and sold within the borders of a single state. 
Instead, they are often produced or manufactured in one territory, refined in another, moved 
through a network across many borders and finally sold all over the world. This makes the issue 
of drug control an immensely complex one that encompasses no single state (WDR, 2018). It 
also makes the history and specifics of this industry extremely broad. 
 
Before delving into the specifics of the case studies, it is necessary to establish a background in 
order to understand the role and significance of illicit narcotics trafficking in Latin America and 
its effects on Mexico and Colombia. This chapter will begin by reviewing the history of the 
narcotics trade, then delve into the literature surrounding Latin America and its narcotics 
trafficking. It will examine the existing writings on public policy outcomes in Mexico and 
Colombia, as well as the literature surrounding issues of drug related violence in this region.  
The methodology employed will then be defined as well as the justification for the case studies 
and the time period.  
 
History 
The consumption of narcotics is not a new phenomenon, or an isolated one (Trocki, 2012). In 
order to understand how this became an illegal security issue for many countries, it is necessary 
to examine opium initially rather than coca (Kan, 2016). This is because the consumption of 
coca and cocaine is far newer globally than opium.  
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Opium poppies have been used medicinally and recreationally for millennia, but they are also the 
origin the illicit drugs industry (Trocki, 2012). Consumed primarily in Asia and the Middle East 
where it is easier to cultivate, opium became an international drug during the 15th century 
crusades, when Western crusaders brought back opium from the Middle East. This represented 
the introduction of recreational opium use to Europe (Trocki, 2012). It also inspired the creation 
of an industry around this drug - the illicit narcotics industry.  
 
The illicit narcotics industry has a particular characteristic that is rare in other industries: 
guaranteed consumption. Narcotics are addictive, often extremely so. Addiction in humans often 
drives them to extremes of behaviour that they wouldn’t otherwise contemplate, and narcotics 
almost guarantee this outcome. This makes the market for narcotics far more lucrative and 
durable than other consumables (Klieman, Caulkins, and Hawken, 2011). Narcotics addition also 
creates a serious set of social problems as the community and the state seek to deal with anti-
social and destructive behaviour caused by the pursuit of funds to satisfy the needs of addiction 
(Klieman et al., 2011). This usually comes in the form of theft, prostitution and violence at a 
base level. Typically, states have responded by criminalising narcotics use down to its lowest 
level, its distribution up to the highest level feasible and, where possible, production.  
  
Narcotics, especially when consumed by large portions of the population, link themselves with 
crime, poverty and other social issues. When this product is being driven into societies, it can 
cause major disruption socially as well as economically. This is exactly what happened in China 
during the nineteenth century when Great Britain sought to rebalance its trade with China by 
importing opium grown cheaply in India (Bickers, 2011). Opium imports into China soared from 
200 chests per year in 1729 to 10,000 per year in the 1820s then 40,000 chests by 1839 (Spence, 
1993). Due to the proliferation of opium, and a magnification of social issues that came with it, 
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opium was banned in China. By declaring opium illegal, illicit narcotics trafficking was born. 
This is because making drugs illegal, especially ones that are highly addictive, does not 
necessarily destroy demand (Klieman et al., 2011). It merely drives it underground. As such, 
banning narcotics simply makes it riskier to obtain them for the consumer. This risk will deter 
some, but again, because they are addictive, it will not deter everyone. It also magnifies the 
criminal links to drug consumption and leaves drug users open to exploitation (Klieman et al., 
2011).  
 
The long-term impact on the state can be devastating. This is demonstrated by the First Opium 
War (1839-1842), in which Great Britain, directly and for political ends, in collusion with British 
companies wanting to make opium profits for commercial ends, combined to attempt to force 
China to re-legalise opium and allow trade (Bickers, 2011). After three years of war, the British 
were successful (Trocki, 2012). In 1842, the Qing dynasty was forced to sign the Treaty of 
Nanking, which granted indemnities to Great Britain, opened five treaty ports to trading by 
foreign merchants including Shanghai, and annexed Hong Kong. The Chinese empire was left 
with extreme political and social effects, and the state was highly destabilised. Opium use 
continued to rise to a peak of 81,000 chests in 1884 (Spence, 1993). Eventually, the Qing 
Dynasty collapsed in 1911 after 273 years, heralding the demise of the imperial system in China 
(Bickers, 2011). There is a valuable lesson in this outcome for states about the destructiveness of 
the illicit narcotics industry.  
 
However, China would not be in isolation for long. Britain itself began to feel the negative 
effects of the opium trade and, during the 18th and 19th centuries, a wave of drug criminalisation 
began across the world (Kan, 2016). In the case of the United States, this even extended to the 
prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s (Andreas, 2000). It was during this wave of criminalisation 
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that illicit narcotics trafficking transformed into the sophisticated system seen today. Prohibition 
of narcotics led to the illegal production of illicit drugs, the moving of these drugs illegally 
through a state, and the selling of these drugs, usually still illegally, in other states (Kan, 2016). 
 
Moving from opium to cocaine, the same sequence of actions and related events is evident. 
Cocaine is the narcotic that Latin America is most associated with. Made from the coca plant, 
cocaine can either be pure, or processed into cheaper and more addictive crack cocaine. Coca is 
cultivated across Latin America, but illegal coca plantations are especially clustered where the 
Andes mountain range and Amazon rainforest provide good cover for coca cultivation and 
refinement (Harding, 1998). Illicit narcotics trafficking has been a prominent issue in Latin 
America since the 1950s, but the creation of crack cocaine propelled Latin America and its coca 
crop into extraordinary demand in the US (Harding, 1998).  
Like any profit-based industry, the most important and basic starting point for understanding 
illegal narcotics trafficking is that of supply and demand. Without demand, there is no profit in 
producing and moving illegal narcotics. This is especially true given the risk and dangers 
involved in this activity. If there is demand, then supply will be created and provided if the price 
point and profit margin are high enough to justify the risk. Today, this is clearly evident in the 
financial difference between the cost of production in Latin America and the street value of 
cocaine and its derivatives in the US. The price of 1kg of wholesale cocaine salts begins at 
1508USD in Colombia, rises to 12,500USD in Mexico, then rapidly increases to between 3000 
and 55000USD in the US, and 176438USD in Australia (UNODC, 2018). The street price of 1 
gram of cocaine has also changed dramatically in the US, shown here in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1-1 – Cost of 1 gram of cocaine in the US (USD). Source: UNODC, 2018  
 
One feature of illicit narcotics trafficking in Latin America is the presence of cartels. Drug 
cartels wield enormous power along drug routes, often controlling the production of narcotics all 
the way through to their distribution (Cook, 2007). Their power is especially concentrated in 
points that require higher levels of organisation and complexity in order to operate within a state, 
such as in Mexico or in Central America.  
 
Another change over time has been the perception of how narcotics trafficking should be 
managed. Once, narcotics control was considered in the realm of public policy, but addiction and 
narcotics trafficking slowly became an issue of law enforcement. Even then, the way narcotics 
and trafficking was perceived was not the same as it is in the present day. In 1971, when the US 
declared a ‘war on drugs’ and a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to their consumption and sale, the 
perception and approach to eliminating illicit narcotics trafficking was overhauled. Illicit 
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narcotics trafficking was transformed into a security issue rather than a law enforcement issue, 
more similar to terrorism than to homicide. This is explored in Kan (2016).   
 
Literature Review 
Latin America for the last 20 years has been a proverbial basket of illicit drugs destined for the 
US market (e.g. Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). Throughout the region, states have 
struggled with controlling illicit drugs and related social issues, especially violence.  
 
Colombia’s struggles are a focal point of this thesis, as it has achieved relative success with drug 
control policies in recent years (Gaviria and Mejía, 2016). Many states have followed 
Colombia’s lead, some implementing legalisation such as Uruguay (Pardo, 2014), and some 
implementing state control strategies like Mexico (Gaviria and Mejia, 2016). However, Mexico 
has continued to struggle with drug control and related violence (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 
2016). This is a key area of critical analysis in this thesis. 
 
Drug related violence in Mexico has risen exponentially and peaked again in 2017 (Agren, 
2018). In many circles, it is considered to have reached crisis point. But this is not a new issue. 
Violence has in fact grown almost unabated for the last decade, with successive Mexican 
governments attempting and failing to control this issue (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). 
Some of its policies have been designed as mirrors to Colombia’s more successful policies. Yet, 
the policies introduced have had seemingly no effect on violence. If anything, they have 
exacerbated it (UNDOC, 2018). Figure 1.2 shows the increase in violence since 2000.  
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Figure 1-2 – Mexico’s Intentional Homicide Rate. Source: UNODC, 2018 
In the same time period, Colombia’s homicide rate has dropped each year since the introduction 
of President Mateus Uribe’s state control and anti-narcotics policies starting in 2002 (see Figure 
1.3). This raises the very important question of why similar policies have failed so dramatically 
in Mexico, yet succeeded in Colombia. 
 
Figure 1-3 – Colombia’s Intentional Homicide Rate. Source: UNODC, 2018 
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The first factor that must be analysed is violence. It provides the quantitative data demonstrating 
success or failure in Colombia and Mexico for this thesis. When examining the issue of drug-
related violence and policy failure in Mexico as against Colombia, it is important to have a 
grounded understanding of what constitutes and measures violence.   
 
There are two basic perspectives on how drug-related violence should be counted. The first, as 
found in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2016) and discussed in Rosen and 
Zepeda Martínez (2016), counts drug-related violence as only those deaths and injuries that 
occur in direct relation with the production, trafficking and sale of illicit substances, as well as 
violence between groups that undertake these activities. As a definition, this is especially popular 
from a government perspective because it confines the issue and reduces public perceptions of its 
scale and scope. This is how it is calculated in official estimates and figures (e.g. UNODC, 2018; 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 1, 2016; Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 
2016, p. 40).  
 
The second perspective is not as common. It is focused on conflict and violence theory rather 
than policy evaluation. It encompasses other types of criminal violence that may not be directly 
connected with illicit substances. One aspect of this definition is sexual assault and related 
violence. Including this type of violence is often part of a feminist approach (e.g. Ewig, Ferree 
and Tripp, 2014), and this is one that is not particularly common in the literature on Mexico.  
 
Both perspectives have merits when examining violence. Drug related homicide is the most 
commonly used metric by policy makers as an indication of the impact of policy, and this is what 
will be used to measure violence levels in this thesis because it is sufficient as a quantitative data 
source to portray the extent of the problem with escalating violence and illegal narcotics.   
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Theories of Violence  
Another area that is especially relevant is what motivates violence. It is useless to discuss how 
policies fail to curb violence without establishing how illicit narcotics traffickers use violence, 
and why they use violence. This is necessary to properly identify the variables involved, and to 
develop a clear causal framework. 
 
The dilemma of criminal violence has a large body of literature attached to it, theories around 
what motivates the individual or group to choose violence as an option, especially given its 
obvious negative and destabilising effects on an individual as well as at a societal level. There 
are three theories in particular that have proved to be popular when evaluating violence. These 
are rational choice theory, human needs theory and the idea of innate violence.  
 
Rational Choice Theory  
When examining rational choice theory as an explanation for criminal violence, there are a 
number of assumptions that must be noted. Firstly, it assumes that human beings are rational 
actors, and that their value judgements are relatively objective (Hindmoor, 2010). The second 
assumption, which is extremely relevant to the study of criminal violence, is that violence is a 
last resort action due to its high costs and potential low benefits (Rios Contreras, 2013). While 
these assumptions are contested by some as reductionist (Hindmoor, 2010), they allow for a 
usable framework when analysing violence.  
 
Rios Contreras, in her paper on decentralisation and violence in Mexico, provides a convincing 
application of rational choice theory to criminal violence (Rios Contreras, 2013). In this account, 
criminal violence is a series of rational calculations. Criminals require a way to regulate and 
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enforce their activities, and in states that have efficient law enforcement, this law enforcement 
functions as an enforcer of trust. If law enforcement is weak, criminals are forced to police 
themselves, and therefore more likely to employ violence (Rios Contreras, 2013, pp.5-10). This 
is a perspective that is more common in literature on violence in Latin America, especially in 
more recent papers which depart from the cultural or personal models (e.g. Duran-Martinez, 
2015).  
While rational choice theory is accurate when describing Mexico’s type of violence, especially 
in the argument made by Rios Contreras, there are other theories of violence that have be 
employed as explanatory accounts. These follow a spectrum of agency and structure, focusing on 
the needs of individuals and the structures that supply these needs. Of these theories, two are 
often prominent when it comes to criminal violence. The first is human needs theory, and the 
second is a psychological theory of violence.  
 
Human Needs Theory  
Human needs theory often focuses on group identity, and is most often applied to ethnic conflict. 
It focuses on the construction of group identity and the power of insecurity in destabilising this 
identity and leading to conflict (Burton, 1990). While this model may be effective in describing 
wars of identity, it is not so applicable to criminal violence, or at least the escalation of criminal 
violence.  
 
Psychological Theory 
This theory was far more common in literature from the 1980s (Jacoby, 2013), and follows the 
idea that violence is innate in some individuals. It is psychologically motivated, and is hard to 
counter as the individuals will continue to return to violence (Jacoby, 2013). This idea has lost 
much credibility, as this assumption often doesn’t adequately account for changes in violence 
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and has underlying racial assumptions (Jacoby, 2013). However, strains of this theory can still be 
found within zero-tolerance policies (e.g. Hume, 2007; Holland, 2013).  
In summary, rational choice theory and to a lesser extent human needs theory are most 
applicable to an analysis of Mexico and Colombia. 
 
Illicit Narcotics Trafficking 
The literature surrounding the process of illicit narcotics trafficking and the various policies 
employed in an attempt to reduce its effects on states and their citizens is dense, although it is 
focussed in certain areas. The first notable area of concentration is literature related directly to 
the US. The majority of literature on narcotics trafficking is either produced in the US or has a 
focus on the model of policy pursued in the US and its implementation elsewhere (e.g. Youngers 
and Rosin, 2005; Freiman, 1996). The English language literature on policy success and failure 
in Mexico is highly limited, and Colombia’s is only slightly more established. This restricts and 
to some extent distorts analysis as it is largely viewed from the perspective of the demand side of 
the equation. It does not adequately look at the supply side metrics. It also simplifies the issue in 
other states, neglecting to explain or explore the detail of why policy succeeds or fails. This is a 
gap that this thesis will fill.  
 
Physical Geography 
The literature on the effects of physical geography on illicit narcotics trafficking in Latin 
America is superficial. It is often mentioned that Mexico and Colombia have different 
geographical demands placed on them by illicit narcotics trafficking, but this is rarely explored 
in detail. Kan (2016) explores the differing effects of geography on illicit narcotics trafficking, 
but does not examine how this can affect both policy and the current experiences.  
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The impact of geography on policy success is also absent from literature on South America. 
However, there are useful comparisons from Africa.  
Herbst examines the importance of physical geography to state strength and stability in Africa 
(Herbst, 2000). He analyses three areas of state power: terrain and population density; border 
politics; and institutional strength. The first two areas are integrally linked to geography, and are 
not often explored in the literature surrounding narcotics trafficking in Latin America, although 
many authors attest their importance.  
The first two aspects of Herbst’s analysis, terrain and population density and border politics, are 
important dependent variables that will be explored in this thesis. Both Colombia and Mexico 
possess terrains and borders that are critical to illicit narcotics trafficking issues.  
 
State Strength and Stability 
Another aspect that is essential and well established in the functioning of states and the 
implementation of law enforcement and policy is the strength and stability of a state. Herbst 
(2000), discusses the strength of state instruments and its relations to geography, something that 
is not discussed in the literature on illicit narcotics trafficking in Latin America. This is also 
explored in McDougall (2009), who charts the link between state weakness and violence. State 
stability is discussed less directly in both Rosen and Zepeda Martínez (2016) and Gaviria and 
Mejía (2016). From a less case-study perspective is Kan (2016), who looks at state stability from 
a broader, illicit narcotics trafficking perspective.  
 
Corruption 
State corruption is often focused on when discussing the failure of policy. In this case, the 
corruption prevents the state from properly implementing the policies and therefore ensuring 
their failure. While it is true that corruption, especially in law enforcement, is a problem in 
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Mexico (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016), the policies have been successful enough to show 
that it did not interfere wholly with the implementation. Corruption measures are not uncommon, 
with the Corruption Perceptions Index (2017) one common measure of corruption. In Colombia, 
Camacho (2016) explores the infiltration of the Colombian government by illicit narcotics 
traffickers, one form of corruption.  
 
Policy Orientation 
It is essential to examine the policies of both Mexico and Colombia in order to determine their 
successes and failures over time. While there is some literature concerning the similarities of 
Mexico and Colombia’s narcotics trafficking policies, these are rarely examined in direct 
contrast. They are also not examined in tandem with the other essential variables of geography 
and state stability. These two dependent factors are essential in understanding the success of 
Colombia’s policies and the failure of Mexico’s policies, despite their superficial similarities.  
 
Colombia’s Policies  
The policies implemented in Colombia can be divided into two basic categories: state 
strengthening and narcotics response. These policies were partly the model used by Mexico 
(Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016).  
 
State Strengthening 
Colombia’s state strengthening and stabilising policies were designed to deal with twin threats: 
the FARC guerrilla group and illicit narcotics traffickers, including FARC itself. De-
centralisation was employed to strengthen Colombia’s remote and rural areas, deploying the 
military to isolated regions to maintain law and order (Carlos Echeverry and Paula Gómez, 
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2016). While this has been extremely successful in decreasing the homicide rate, there have been 
accusations of human-rights abuses (Borda, 2016).  
 
Narcotics response 
The suite of policies designed to combat illicit narcotics trafficking is known as ‘Plan 
Colombia’. Plan Colombia was partially funded by the US, and involved a number of policies 
including aerial fumigation of coca crops, removal of coca crops by law enforcement and 
military, incentivised agriculture, drug education programs, and zero-tolerance policies for those 
charged with narcotics trafficking (Mejía, 2016). Colombia has enjoyed considerable success 
with this policy package, although the individual policy of zero-tolerance is controversial 
because of the lack of clear data in any jurisdiction globally that it has a tangible effect on crime 
and violence. In many respects, it is considered to be part of the price that Colombia had to pay 
for US financial support, given that zero-tolerance policy is prevalent across America (Youngers 
and Rosin, 2005).   
 
 
Mexico’s Policies 
There were three primary policies pursued in Mexico. The first is kingpin strategy, the second is 
based on seizures and the third is a hard-line, minimal tolerance approach to prosecution. These 
policies have different impacts and issues, and so will be examined separately.  
 
Kingpin Strategy  
The kingpin strategy involves first identifying key players in structures such as drug cartels, and 
then removing (by arrest or death) those players in order to destabilise and eventually collapse 
the structure (Lindo and Padilla-Romo, 2018). The broader aim is to reduce the number of 
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players in Mexico’s drug war, thereby reducing the mobility and power of drug cartels. In 
Mexico, this can be seen to succeed in its direct goal, but has been a failure in its broader aims 
(Lindo and Padilla-Romo, 2018; Calderón, Roubles, Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2015). While 
it has led to the partial collapse of cartels such as the Los Zetas (Calderón et al., 2015), it has 
actually led to increased violence as the ensuing power struggles within the cartels and between 
the cartels increases violence dramatically.  
 
The kingpin strategy is one that has a large body of literature. It is examined in relation to 
Mexico by Rosen and Zepeda (2016), who discuss the reason for its failure, as well as by Lindo 
and Padilla-Romo (2018). Both of these sources provide good arguments about the problems 
with this policy, however they still leave a gap around the failure of Mexico’s policies as a 
whole. This section of the literature also provides clues as to why violence remains a problem, in 
that it is an expression of the greater issues that plague Mexico’s drug policy.  
 
Drug Seizures  
Another focus of Mexican policy is drug seizures. Its function is to intercept and prevent drug 
trafficking across Mexican borders (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). The success of this 
approach is difficult to evaluate, as the movement of these substances is illicit in nature, and is 
only discovered when they are actually seized. However, based on the evidence of the volume of 
illegal narcotics entering the US and therefore what continues to fuel the drug trade, it can be 
concluded that seizures are not having much effect on drug supply. Bunker estimates the income 
of drug cartels, and shows that seizures do not have a huge effect on income levels (Bunker, 
2010). This is one policy area that is not analysed as having a huge effect on violence, as cartels 
tend to sacrifice a certain amount of product in order to continue to operate unimpeded (Rosen 
and Zepeda Martínez, 2016).  
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 Minimal Tolerance 
The final aspect of Mexican policy was a hard-line, minimal tolerance approach with the 
involvement of the military or specialised police. This has an impact on both the kingpin strategy 
and drug seizures as it affects how these strategies are carried out. Rosen and Zepeda provide a 
list of designated ‘kingpins’ and coverage of the military’s involvement during Calderon’s 
presidency (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016, p39-57). This approach to law enforcement has 
not been without controversy, with many groups citing human rights violations (see Freeman and 
Luis Sierra, 2005). It also appears to have not been successful, given that levels of violence have 
continued to increase exponentially. 
 
United States Influence 
Permeating the literature on drug control in Mexico and Colombia, and Latin America in 
general, is the question of how much the influence of the US affects drug related issues in these 
countries. The US provides high volumes of financial and military aid to countries like Mexico 
and Colombia, and in exchange has a degree of influence on what policies are pursued 
(Youngers and Rosin, 2005). Zero-tolerance against individuals and the kingpin strategy are 
favoured policies of the US which may not have been necessarily relevant to Mexico or 
Colombia but which were introduced to satisfy the US and ensure the flow of aid.  
 
But the influence of the US is greater than just agenda-setting in policy options. The statistical 
fact remains that the US is the main market for drugs produced in and trafficked through Latin 
America (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 1, 2016). This US market is 
extremely large and extremely profitable, and as long as it exists there will be production in 
order to feed this market (World Drug Report, 2018). 
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Policy Failure 
In order to properly examine the issue of violence, it is extremely important to be able to deem 
when a drug-related policy has ‘failed.’ In this case, the lack of impact on rates of criminal 
violence is used as a sign that policy has failed.  
There are a number of potential contributing factors, but three factors appear more often in the 
literature on Mexico. They are state corruption and the political structure of Mexico, economic 
and social issues and the influence of the US (e.g. Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). 
 
Methodology  
The methodology used in this thesis is comparative analysis (Burnham, Lutz, Gran and Layton-
Henry, 2008). A comparative analysis is extremely useful here because Mexico and Colombia 
display opposing trends in the same area, and have many commonalities that make them able to 
be compared especially well. This is important as the situation surrounding Mexico’s failure and 
Colombia’s success is cause by the interaction of a number of variables, something comparative 
analysis is highly suited for (Burnham et al., 2008). The method is case study comparisons. As 
with comparative analysis, this essay will cover one independent and two dependent variables.  
The independent variable explored is policy orientation, while the two dependent variables are 
geography and state stability.  
The three other important factors to consider when justifying this methodology is case selection, 
time period, and data sources.  
 
Case Selection 
The primary focus of this thesis is to explore illicit drug trafficking and related levels of violence 
in countries where trafficking occurs. Most countries in Latin and Central America struggle with 
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illicit drug trafficking and violence, especially those in Central America (Youngers and Rosin, 
2005). While the illicit drug industry in Latin America is infamous for cocaine, many other illicit 
drugs are produced and transported by this industry as well. As drug consumption in the US and 
internationally increases, the industry in Latin America grows, like any other profit-motivated 
business enterprise (WDR, 2018).  
 
Colombia and Mexico are important cases because they allow an exploration of the way policy 
interacts with violence and illicit drug trafficking.  
 
Mexico is considered to be a relatively strong state, with a strong rule of law (Rosen and Zepeda 
Martínez, 2016). This makes the increase in violence and the seeming uncontrollability of drug 
cartels surprising, at least at first glance. In addition, Mexico is also a good case study because it 
has attempted to introduce a wide range of policies to combat illegal drug trafficking and 
violence for many years and these policies have demonstrably failed (see Calderón et al., 2015; 
Cook, 2007; Rios Contreras, 2013). This warrants investigation because these policies have 
succeeded in other states, such as Colombia (Mejía, 2016). There is a small body of scholarship 
in this area, which is growing as the homicide rate continues to climb. There is a sense that there 
is more to this surprising rise in violence than the current body of literature has disclosed. In this 
thesis, employing the case study of Colombia helps to shed new light on this apparent mystery of 
increased violence in Mexico.  
 
Another factor that impacts on the puzzle of Mexico is the low level of drug consumption in the 
nation itself. Mexico has a relatively low rate of drug consumption, especially when compared 
with the US (International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 1, 2016). This shows that 
the market for illicit substances is not internal, but is a by-product of the production destined for 
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the US and other global markets (WDR, 2018). This makes it a matter of economics and profit. 
This should theoretically make the development of policy on illicit drug control more 
straightforward. However, just because the population is not consuming drugs does not mean 
that they are not inherently woven into the illicit drug trade for other reasons (see Camacho, 
Gaviria and Rodreíguez, 2016).  
 
This points to underlying economic factors at work in Mexico that are driving people towards 
involvement in illegal narcotics. A comparison with Colombia is again useful. Data analysis 
shows that Colombia has had solid, long-term economic growth since 2000, meaning that people 
have better choices for the future than working for the illegal narcotics industry (The World 
Bank, 2017). It also gives the population more of a stake in the state and therefore improves state 
stability. The situation in Mexico differs, in that it has a large economy but has experienced 
serious economic underperformance in the twenty-first century.  
 
In summary, Mexico’s situation looks inexplicable. Mexico and Colombia, over a similar time 
period from 2000- 2015, have employed drug-control policies with ostensibly similar aims 
(Rosen and Zepeda Rodríguez, 2016). However, the effects of these policies in Mexico has been 
substantially different to Colombia.  To explain the failure of Mexico’s policies in this thesis, it 
is thus essential to compare them to the set of policies on Colombia that have succeeded in the 
same arena.  
 
Time Period 
There must be limits placed upon the case studies to allow for proper analysis. In the case of this 
thesis, it must be a period of time that is long enough to definitively show the effects of any 
policies introduced. If the time period is too short, there is a chance that the variables are not 
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related to policies being examined. Alternatively, if the time period is too long, then again, it is 
harder to account for the variables that affect the homicide rate.  
 
Both Colombia and Mexico will be examined over the time period of 2000 – 2018. These case 
studies have fortuitous overlap, as both began to introduce policies to combat the illicit drug 
trade around 2000. In Colombia, this was a high point in the homicide rate, and represented a 
period with great state instability (UNODC, 2018). By contrast, Mexico was at a low point on its 
historical homicide rate and had been enjoying stable democracy for a number of years 
(UNODC, 2018).  
 
There is one caveat on the demarcation of this time period, which is the Colombian civil war. 
The civil war and its protagonists had a strong influence on the shape of the Colombian state and 
how it dealt with illegal narcotics and violence.  
By the year 2000, Colombia had been engaged for 36 years in a bitter and violent civil war. In 
2016, Colombia’s National Center for Historical Memory estimated that 220,000 people had 
been killed, 25,500 had disappeared and 5.7 million had been displaced since the civil war 
started (Historical Memory Group, 2016).  
The civil war started in May 1964, when a group of 350 insurgents had declared an independent 
republic. This group was the FARC.  
Initially, FARC was just a leftist guerrilla group. In the 1970s, it survived by extorting ransoms 
from kidnappings. However, FARC used the illicit narcotics trade from the 1980s to fund a 
massive military expansion that led to a direct challenge to the state. It also sought political 
legitimacy. FARC participated in elections throughout the 1980s. In 1999, FARC’s membership 
peaked at 18,000 members and kidnappings reached 3,000 in total (Saab and Taylor, 2009).  
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President Juan Manuel Santos (Calderon), started a new peace process in 2012 (Caspar, 2016). 
By this stage, FARC was principally operating as an illegal narcotics business, using violence 
and kidnapping to protect its operations. This ended in the historic ceasefire in 2016 (Casper, 
2016), and an amnesty for FARC members in 2017 (Wheeler, 2017) 
 
The end point of 2018 is also important in setting a time period for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
both countries have now broken records with their homicide rates, with Colombia at an all-time 
low, and Mexico at an all-time high (Figure 1.1). This allows for great comparability and is 
useful when comparing the successes and failures of their policies, and how these policies 
impacted upon rates of violence. There is another important point to following these case studies 
through to the present, and this is to do with the drug-control policies pursued in Mexico. Each 
year violence has only risen, making it necessary to continue through to 2018 (Associated Press, 
2018).  
 
Data Selection 
This thesis will draw on a number of important secondary data sources. The primary source is 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime statistics (UNODC). The UNODC publishes the 
Narcotics Control Report, as well as supplying accurate international statistics on drugs and 
crime.  
Another important data source is the data collected by the World Bank in relation to illicit 
narcotics trafficking, and Worldwide Governance Indicators, as well as levels of violence.  
Together, these two sources form an accurate and strong basis for crime statistics.  
Another useful tool is The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency 
International. It is useful for comparative scrutiny of corruption because it is a composite 
analysis of up to 16 different corruption surveys and assessments by major global organisations. 
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The CPI ranks countries on a scale of 0 to 100 using a range of 10 different percentiles with a 
low percentile indicating that a country is perceived as more corrupt and a high percentile 
indicating lower perception levels of corruption (CPI, 2017).  
 
Official government statistics from the Mexican and Colombian government are also referenced 
in this paper.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has laid out the literature in this field, where it is lacking in depth and where there is 
usable data and analysis. It has explored the history and importance of illicit narcotics 
trafficking, as well as how it operates in the present day.  
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Chapter 2: Geography and Border Politics 
Introduction  
Since the rise of the nation state, geography has become essential in defining what constitutes a 
state. It is the territory that a state controls, but beyond this basic point it is also the shape of the 
landscape, the resources that the state has access to and the countries that surround it. Before the 
advent of instantaneous communication, geography greatly affected the flow of power and 
information through states, and even today it can be utilised to defend or disadvantage a state 
(Herbst, 2000). As such, it is surprising how little geography is explored in the literature on 
illegal narcotics production and trading as a dependent variable. It is often mentioned, as in Kan 
(2016), and tagged as a significant subsidiary factor in Mexico and in Colombia, but it is not 
often explored in its own right.  
 
This is doubly surprising considering that geography is not only essential to the power of a state, 
but also integral to the viability of illicit narcotics trafficking. A simple example can illustrate 
this point. No-one would understate the impact of geography on agriculture, how it affects the 
type of crops that are grown successfully in any location, and how much effort is required to 
grow those crops. Illicit narcotics are just like any other agricultural crop, but unlike other 
agricultural crops it is illegal to cultivate them. This only increases the demands and importance 
of geography to illicit narcotics production and trafficking. Geography facilitates the emergence 
and sustainability of the illicit narcotics industry, but it can also be used against that industry by 
the state if a government can develop feasible policies to harness and exploit geography to their 
own objectives (Kan, 2016). The state’s objectives in this instance are to apply its powers against 
illegal practices – in this case the production and trafficking of narcotics – to mitigate, reduce or 
even eradicate this industry.   
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In this chapter, geography and its dependent impacts will be explored. First, the theoretical 
background and importance of geography to states and illicit narcotics trafficking will be 
established. The idea of ‘geography’ will then be explored in two aspects: the geographical 
landscape, and border politics. These will be applied to Colombia, then Mexico, and will 
contribute important information to the different trajectories of violence in both countries. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude with an evaluation of the importance of this variable for 
violence in Colombia and Mexico.  
The first and foremost point when examining the differences between Mexican and Colombian 
geography and its impact on illicit narcotics trafficking and violence is that Colombia and 
Mexico serve different points of the narcotics trafficking chain (Kan, 2016). Colombia is a 
cultivation state, where coca is grown and refined. While it does involve some distribution, it is 
not to the same extent as Mexico. Mexico, on the other hand, possesses value due to its multiple, 
varied distribution points (Kan, 2016). While it does produce illicit narcotics as well, a large 
volume of the narcotics produced in other countries find their way through Mexico into the US 
(Andreas, 2000).  
 
While the importance of geography and its impacts on a multitude of factors is the same in both 
cases, the geographical demands of the narcotics traffickers are different in each case.  
 
Theoretical foundations 
The first necessary thing to establish is what ‘geography’ means in this chapter. Following the 
style of Herbst (2000), geography refers to two things: the physical landscape, population 
density and travelability, termed ‘geography’; and what states a country borders and the 
dynamics between those states, here termed ‘border politics’.  
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Geography is a very important dependent variable when examining the effects of policy, as 
geography affects state strength, stability and power, which is inherently important when 
implementing policy and in determining whether that policy can be successful.  
 
The physical landscape is incredibly important to understanding state power and stability, as well 
as illicit narcotics trafficking.  
It has long been established that states with inhospitable terrains have difficulty projecting their 
power. This is because the modern construction of the nation state is highly centralised (Herbst, 
2000).  
Size is often an issue, but climate is also an issue. In the case of Latin America, which is 
rainforested, there are sections of rainforest that are impossible to traverse in large numbers, and 
also that are largely unexplored (Shelley and Mertz, 2017). From a law enforcement perspective, 
this makes it harder to enforce the law, and also makes it easier for criminals such as narcotics 
traffickers to avoid the law (Herbst, 2000; Andreas, 2000).  
Population density is another important aspect of state power, in relation to geography.  
If the population density is low or widely distributed, it is harder to project power and regulate 
law over that population (Herbst, 2000).  
Border politics is especially important in the context of illicit narcotics trafficking. As explained 
in the previous chapter, the trans-national nature of illicit narcotics trafficking means that border 
politics become crucial. For illicit narcotics trafficking, it is essential to form a chain through 
which product can be transported. These chains must often pass through multiple states (Kan, 
2016). These routes may be by land, sea or sky. The chains represent the flow of product and the 
flow of profit, and are extremely essential for illicit narcotics traffickers to maintain. If the 
chains are broken, then trafficking becomes impossible and the route must be adapted. This is 
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essential to consider in the case of Colombia and Mexico, as these chains represent enormous 
profits, and this impacts on the utility of violence for narcotics traffickers.  
 
Geography and statehood are inextricably linked. As states have defined borders, geography is 
essential to understanding interactions within and between states. However, geography is also 
essential in understanding illicit drug trafficking.  
Illicit drug trafficking is the growth and preparation of drugs deemed illegal (usually defined by 
the country the drugs are destined for), and then the smuggling and moving of these drugs to 
areas where they are in demand (Kan, 2016). Sometimes this takes place within the borders of 
one state, but much more often it crosses multiple state boundaries (Kan, 2016). This is because 
of the differing needs of each stage in the production and sales process. Production requires areas 
where the drug can either be grown or artificially produced. If it is grown, as in cocaine, the 
environment must be right for the cultivation of the plant, but it must also be a location where 
the state cannot destroy the crop and disrupt operations frequently. This can either be because it 
is remote and inaccessible, or combined with a state that is unable or unwilling to intervene 
(Kan, 2016). In Latin America, the cultivation of the Coca plant in Colombia fits this model: 
Colombia’s mountainous regions combined with deep forest enable coca to be grown, without 
the observance of the state (Harding, 1998).  
 
The illegal drug product must then be moved to the area where it will be sold: this is the 
trafficking leg of the journey. It must be moved across state boundaries without the state that it is 
moving through being alerted to its presence. While this is easiest through states that are weak, it 
can also occur through stronger states (National Drug Intelligence Center, 2006).  
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Finally, the drug is imported, and distributed through a network for sale. The profits then flow 
slowly back down the chain, and the process commences again. 
The world of illicit drug trafficking is very much a globalised and international one. For 
example, cocaine produced in Colombia is consumed in the US and Australia while heroin from 
Afghanistan makes its way through Asia before again crossing into Australia and the US (The 
World Drug Report, 2018). The one constant of this market is demand. These are rich and highly 
developed countries with high levels of disposable income, combined with harsh drug 
enforcement policies which basically allows a premium to be charged in the market. This 
balances the risk of importation with high profitability. There is consistent and unwavering 
demand for illegal drugs, and as long as there is demand there will be areas that can be used for 
supply (The World Drug Report, 2018). This international aspect of drug trafficking makes it an 
issue that is very hard to combat, because of the involvement of multiple states, different legal 
systems and policies on drugs, etc (Kan, 2016).  
 
There are a number of important points to be made before moving onto the specifics of Mexico 
and Colombia, and their places in Latin American drug trafficking. Production, refinement and 
trafficking may all take place in a single state, with the product being sold in a different state. It 
is important to note which processes go on in which state, because it may be that this has an 
effect on the enforcement of drug policy (Kan, 2016).  
 
Mexico and Colombia are both situated on the path for drug trafficking in Latin America to the 
US. However, there are distinct differences between the two countries. Colombia shot to 
prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, for beginning to produce massive amounts of cocaine and 
crack cocaine especially. In the world of illicit drug trafficking Colombia has primarily been a 
production and refinement state, termed a ‘Source state’ by Kan (2016). The coca plant is 
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cultivated, then is refined to produce raw cocaine that is moved out of the state and through 
Central America, with the destination being the US. Mexico is a wildly different case, home to 
both the production and distribution of drugs (Kan, 2016). In 2007, approximately 90% of the 
cocaine consumed in the US is estimated to have come through Mexico (Cook, 2007). Violent 
drug cartels, one of the features of the landscape of the Mexican drug market, formed primarily 
around the trafficking and distribution of these drugs through Mexico and into the US (Cook, 
2007).  
 
Colombia 
Geography 
The geography of Colombia couldn’t be more useful to the cultivation of illicit narcotics. 
Approximately half the country is covered in forest, the dense rainforest of the Amazon and the 
Andes in the North and West, and the plains in the South and east (The World Factbook, 2018). 
The majority of the population is clustered on the western side of the Andes mountain ranges, 
with the eastern plains more sparsely populated (The World Factbook, 2018).  
 
Colombia is the only country in South America with borders on both the Caribbean Sea and the 
Pacific Ocean (Shelley and Metz, 2017). Its neighbours are the politically unstable Venezuela 
and Brazil in the north, and Ecuador and Peru in the south. This geographical positioning is also 
uniquely useful to the production of illicit narcotics.  
 
Colombia is known for its cultivation of the coca leaf, and the refinement of this leaf into the 
narcotics cocaine and crack cocaine. Coca leaf and cocaine have long been produced in the 
region, but Peru and Ecuador were the primary large-scale coca producers, with Colombia a 
minor third party (Harding, 1998).  
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However, in the early 1990s that began to change. Production increased dramatically to around 
150,000 hectares under cultivation (Harding, 1998). By the mid-1990s, Colombia had begun to 
produce coca on a scale to outstrip its neighbours (Harding, 1998; see Carlos Echeverry and 
Paula Gómez, Figure 14.9, 2016). Colombia in 2016 seized the most cocaine internationally, 
36% of all cocaine seized. See Figure 2.1 for cocaine seizures in Colombia for, 2012 – 2016. It is 
believed that 90% of the cocaine in the US has had its roots in Colombia (INSCR, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 2-1 – Drug Seizures Colombia, 2012 – 2016. SOURCE: UNODC, 2018 
 
Critically for this study, this continuous change in production levels has not been reflected in the 
rates of violence. Since 2000, Colombia’s murder rate has fallen dramatically to an all-time low 
as at 2017 (see Figure 1.1). This is a superficially surprising statistic, considering rising levels of 
drug cultivation and production are usually linked with rising violence, as has been the case in 
Mexico.  
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The importance of geography is instantly clear when looking at the levels of coca production in 
this region. Peru, Ecuador and Colombia are all the primary producers of coca, although 
Colombia remains at the forefront in the current day (Carlos Echeverry and Paula Gómez, 2016). 
These are all countries that have large areas of the Andes crossing them, providing many benefits 
to the cultivation of illicit narcotics (WDR, 2018). The Andres is the longest mountain range in 
the world, and crosses continuously along the edge of South America, through Venezuela, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and down through Chile and Argentina, a distance of 8900km 
(Denevan, Tulio Veláquez and Steward, 2017). This creates an environment very useful for 
narcotics trafficking, and hard to operate across without technology.  
 
One of the first and foremost of these attributes is tied to state power. As can be seen from 
Figure 2.2, a topographical map of Colombia, the Andes cut a swathe through the country. This 
separation has contributed to the fragility of Colombia’s state apparatus, and was a contributing 
factor to the persistence of the FARC.   
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Figure 2-2 – Topographical Map of Colombia (Map of Colombia, 2008) 
Another benefit to this geography for drug production is that it provides mobility for drug 
traffickers and the cultivation of illicit narcotics. As the states do not exercise strong control over 
these areas due to less hospitable terrain for the projection of traditional state power, it is easier 
for drug cultivation to be moved from area to area until it is at the optimal location. Any 
problems with state intervention can be easily handled by rapid relocation to a lower pressure 
point. The optimal location is one with limited state intervention, that is isolated but not totally 
cut off from a supply of labour and transport logistics routes (Kan, 2016). A perfect example of 
this mobility relates to the production of coca on the Ecuadorian border. Since the Colombian 
government began aerial fumigation of coca crops in the 1990s, it has become harder for large 
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scale coca operations to produce a sustainable crop (Ramírez Lemus, Standton, and Walsh, 
2005). As such, the levels of coca leaf produced in Peru and Ecuador begin to rise (Echeverry 
and Paula Gómez, 2016). The terrain already makes it hard to run anti-growing operations for 
military and law enforcement along the border region, meaning that the ability of either 
Colombia or Ecuador to intervene is severely curbed.  
 
Border politics 
When it comes to border politics and geography, Colombia is also in a prime position for illicit 
narcotics trafficking. There are certain features that make a location better or worse for 
trafficking narcotics.  
There are two primary ways that illicit narcotics are transported: land and sea. Colombia is 
ideally placed for both these forms of transportation and their consequent trade routes. It has 
access to both the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, as well as land borders to Panama and 
therefore Central America (Shelley and Mertz, 2017). Effectively, Columbia sits right at the 
heart of the geographical and logistics nexus of South America. This is a geographical feature 
that no other state in the region shares. All these routes are used to great effect. These routes are 
only useful if the states that control the boundaries are weak or at least incapable of enforcing 
their boundaries (Kan, 2016). 
 
The shared geography of Peru, Ecuador and Colombia also makes it necessary for inter-state 
cooperation when dealing with the cultivation of coca (Borda, 2016). As the ideal environment 
of cultivation is what attracts growing operations in the first place, these operations are often 
mobile across country borders because state boundaries play no part in defining or limiting the 
quality of the production ecosystem. The cartels that control the growing of coca have thus 
become trans-national organisations, often operating in multiple states at once (Rosen and 
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Zepeda Martínez, 2017). This makes it doubly easy for areas for coca cultivation to be selected, 
while also making it harder for states to eradicate either on an individual or collective basis. 
State cooperation on illicit narcotics trafficking has historically been cordial, but has not always 
been effective. Peru, Ecuador and Colombia all have problems with systemic government 
corruption, which is often exploited by drug cartels and narcotics traffickers in order to avoid 
harassment and persecution (Borda, 2016).  
 
 
Mexico 
The geography of Mexico, like Colombia, has great impacts on narcotics trafficking in the 
region. But in Mexico, this is less a matter of the geography and more a result of the politics of 
its borders (Andreas, 2000).  
The geography of Mexico is less suited to drug cultivation than Colombia. In comparison, 
Mexico is relatively flat, and has historically had a very dense population (The World 
Factbook, 2018). This combination of a hospitable and navigable terrain and a concentrated 
population has lent relative power to the operations of the state. The Mexican state has been able 
to control its territories with relative ease vis a vis Colombia.  
This negates one of the primary needs of illicit narcotics cultivation: the inability of the state to 
intervene (Kan, 2016).  
 
Border politics  
Like Colombia, Mexico also has access to both the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.  
There is one significant difference between Mexico and Colombia in border politics however. 
Mexico shares a border with one of the most powerful states globally, as well as one of the 
highest consumers of illicit narcotics globally. That state is the US. This makes Mexico’s land 
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border of immediate and significant importance to narcotics traffickers (Andreas, 2000). The 
market for illicit narcotics is not Mexico – this can be seen in the revealing 2016 International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume 1 (2016), which states that only 1.5% of Mexico’s 
population uses illicit narcotics, and that the most commonly used narcotic is marijuana. This 
similarly high level is common to the UK and Australia, higher than any state in South and 
Central America (excluding Paraguay) (INCSR, 2016). The cocaine produced in Colombia and 
Mexico goes instead to the US, Australia and Europe (WDR, 2018). In 2016, it was estimated 
that the prevalence of cocaine use in the US was 2.4% and Australia was 2.5%. This is in 
comparison to Mexico, which was at 0.8% in 2016, and Colombia which was at 0.7% in 2013 
(UNODC, 2018).  
 
The importance of the border to the narcotics trade, as well as to the rise of violence in Mexico, 
can be seen by examining homicide levels across Mexican states (Figure 2.3). The states with the 
highest murder rate are concentrated at points near the border. The homicide breakdown by state 
is extremely revealing. States with the most violence lie along the US border, as well as states 
that contain important ports for narcotics trafficking (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2017). These 
areas are rife with violence, as cartels battle each other for territory and access to these points.  
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Figure 2-3 – Drug war death rates, by state, December 2006-December 2010. Source: Geo-Mexico, 2011 
It is this positioning of access points to the US that has led to the proliferation of drug cartels in 
Mexico (Andreas, 2000). Its utility as a distribution point, combined with the sheer demand for 
illicit narcotics, makes it cost effective to attempt to cultivate and produce narcotics on site, 
rather than sourcing them from other states (Freeman and Luis Sierra, 2005). Cocaine, heroin 
and marijuana are all produced in Mexico as well as smuggled in and through Mexico from 
Colombia and Ecuador (WDR, 2018; INCSR, 2016). Even though the risks of law enforcement 
interventions are higher, they may break even with the risks of moving product through multiple 
states. Potentially it is also cheaper and safer from a security perspective for them to produce the 
drugs where their control is higher. In this case, it is not the physical geography that makes the 
utility but the closeness to the US market.  
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Mexico and Colombia in Comparison 
The difference between the utility of Mexico and Colombia as drug producers comes down to 
the interaction between the state and the geography. Mexico’s geography is not inherently suited 
to narcotics cultivation, but its border politics is suited to drug distribution (Andreas, 2000). As 
such, it can be used for narcotics cultivation, but it only is because of the border politics. If the 
state began to leverage itself against narcotics cultivation, there is no geographical imperative to 
keep cultivating it in Mexico. There is however, a geographic imperative to continue to produce 
it in Colombia (Shelley and Metz, 2017).  
 
Distribution of illicit narcotics in Colombia and Mexico is the reverse of this situation. Mexico, 
given its border politics, is indispensable to narcotics traffickers, whereas Colombia is readily 
interchangeable between Peru and Ecuador, if slightly more useful than both of those states (see 
Andreas, 2000; Ramírez Lemus et al., 2005). This creates important forces that motivate the 
value judgements of narcotics traffickers in both cases, and then impact heavily on their 
behaviour when it comes to law enforcement confrontation.  
As narcotic cultivation is easier in a number of states across South America, the need for 
narcotics traffickers to resist law enforcement is different. The utility of violence is also reduced, 
as it is easier to simply move the cultivation operations around the state or even across other 
state borders if necessary. It can then be moved back, as can be seen in the shared production of 
coca in Equador, Peru and Colombia (Harding, 1998).  
This is identical to narcotics distributers as there are different avenues for transportation and 
cultivation. This makes it far less important for narcotics traffickers to resort to violence in 
Colombia, as they simply alter their operations to where there is a vacuum of law enforcement, 
and avoid violence to maintain this vacuum.  
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Mexico does not have this situation. Given its border politics, it is the last and most useful stop 
on the journey for illicit narcotics into the US (Andreas, 2000). There are no practical 
alternatives for these narcotics. The traffickers in Mexico therefore face a more threatening 
dilemma when faced with state law enforcement. It is easier for the state to project power across 
Mexico’s more hospitable landscape, and the traffickers do not have other easy routes to move 
their drugs along. As such, they come up against more state power and have nowhere to go. This 
changes the calculations on the utility of violence (Rios Contreras, 2013). As they must continue 
to use the same ports and smuggling routes, they instead have more to gain by engaging with the 
state in a violent manner. They must convince the state that it is too much effort to regulate and 
intervene so that they can continue to use their routes. They must also hold these routes in the 
face of other organisations at the same time (Cook, 2007). This makes the utility of violence 
much higher in Mexico than Colombia, which has a great impact on how policies are successful 
or not in both places (Rios Contreras, 2013).  
But geography is not an independent arbiter of success, it merely serves to amplify the ability of 
a state to introduce policy and enforce policy, as well as effecting the equation for traffickers 
over the utility of violence. The geography combines with two other important factors, the 
equally dependent state strength and stability and the independent variable of policy orientation, 
to explain the rising violence in Mexico and the reduced violence in Colombia.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have established the importance of geography as in dependent variable in the 
puzzle of violence in Mexico and Colombia. The next chapter will explore the importance of 
state strength and stability in supporting policy and the effects this has on the levels of violence 
and the behaviour of illicit narcotics traffickers. It will also explore the interaction between 
geography and state stability and strength and how this impacts on policy orientation.  
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Chapter 3: State Stability and Power  
Introduction 
This chapter turns to another essential element of a state: its level of stability and the 
concomitant level of power that it can exercise both within its borders as well as externally in 
multi-lateral organisations or other alliances.  
 
States introduce policy and legislation in order to deal with important social issues such as rising 
violence, through law enforcement measures intended to reduce their impact (see Rosen and 
Zepeda Martínez, 2016; McDougall, 2009). The rationale for pursuing state stability is two-fold 
– to give security to the population and to preserve the existence of the state itself. State stability 
is a cornerstone of community harmony, social wellbeing, quality of life and economic 
development (Youngers and Rosin, 2005).  
 
When considering policy, the actual level of power of the state must also be considered. This is 
because power is essential in understanding if the state has the capability to implement their 
policies, and how the policies have been carried out (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016)). The 
issue of suppressing the illegal narcotics trade and its concomitant violence is so serious that 
policy should not be developed without an awareness of the relative power of the state to 
implement that policy and achieve successful, quantitative outcomes (see Gaviria and Mejía, 
2016).   
 
During the course of this chapter, the relative strengths and stability of Mexico and Colombia 
will be examined, as well as the effects of their actual level of power on illicit narcotics 
trafficking. The importance of corruption will be explored, and how this has impacted on the 
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levels of violence and state stability in Mexico and Colombia. Finally, the impact of geography 
on state stability and illicit narcotics trafficking will be examined.  
 
Alongside the geography of a state, the terrain and the countries it borders, there is another 
important variable that impacts on the effects of policy.  
 
State stability and strength is an important factor in illicit narcotics trafficking. When states are 
stable and strong, they are able to regulate and enforce laws with a degree of effectiveness that is 
detrimental to illicit narcotics trafficking. For illicit narcotics trafficking to operate effectively, 
the state must be failing or weak (Kan, 2016)  
 
Corruption 
Corruption is an important factor in determining both state stability and state strength.  
Mexico is a stable state, but it is also a corrupt state (Morris, 2012). It is virtually impossible for 
the illicit narcotics industry to operate without bribes (Morris, 2012). However, it is also hard to 
let this level of corruption continue unchecked, certainly if a state wishes to strengthen and 
become more stable, but even if it appears stable enough. If organisations or groups begin to 
exploit this level of corruption, then decay of stability can happen extremely quickly (Rosen and 
Zepeda Martínez, 2016). 
 
Colombia 
Colombia’s stability and strength has historically been highly questionable. From the mid-1960s 
until a formal ceasefire in 2016, Colombia was in the midst of a protracted civil war between the 
left-wing government and the right-wing guerrillas, the FARC (McDougall, 2009). During this 
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fifty year period, there were many civilian casualties, and many points at which the Colombian 
state seemed poised to fall (Ramírez Lemus et al., 2005). 
 
Combined with the civil war, from the 1980s Colombia began to be a point of coca cultivation 
for the growing illicit narcotic trafficking industry (Harding, 1998). As established in the 
previous chapter, Colombia had the ideal geography and border positioning for the cultivation 
and trafficking of illicit narcotics: the heavy rainforest made coca cultivation in secret easier; the 
close proximity of Peru and Ecuador, at the time the major producers of cocaine, made supply 
easy; and the links to both Central America by land, and the Pacific Sea and the Caribbean Sea 
by water made it easy to distribute those drugs interstate (WRD, 2018). But these geographical 
benefits were not the only benefit to establishing an illicit narcotics trafficking industry in 
Colombia: the other was the fragility of its state (Kan, 2016).  
 
Narcotics cultivation is extremely labour and time intensive, and requires space and time within 
which to cultivate and refine narcotics. As described in Harding (1998), to extract 1kg of cocaine 
requires 96kg of coca leaf, and a multistage process that involves soaking the leaves in gasoline, 
then combining the product with acid or acetone, baking that liquid in an oven until it becomes a 
paste, then turning that paste into a powder. This process only becomes more efficient over time 
(Mejía and Rico, 2016). All throughout this process, the intervention of the state must be 
avoided. There are many points of high vulnerability to detection along the production path. The 
cultivation of the coca in the fields must go unimpeded. Gasoline and acid must be purchased, 
usually at retail outlets (Mejía and Rico, 2016). The leaf must be harvested then soaked and 
refined. The baking of the liquid in the oven, producing immense amounts of heat, must go 
undiscovered (Harding, 1998). Finally, the product must be moved out of the state. In a stable 
and strong state, with low levels of corruption and high levels of arrest and prosecution of laws, 
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this process is extremely difficult. In those states, the process must go entirely unobserved by 
law enforcement at every stage, which is a very difficult proposition. But this is not the case in 
states with high levels of corruption that are not strong enough to enforce law, no matter how 
good these statutory instruments are in principle (Kan, 2016).  
 
Colombia is a state that is aided in two ways towards successful production of high volumes of 
illegal narcotics uninterrupted by the state. Firstly, the geography discussed in the previous 
chapter does make it easier for this process to go unobserved (McDougall, 2009). Secondly, the 
weakness of the state at the beginning of the 1980s through to the early 2000s, and the high 
levels of corruption with the involvement of narco-trafficking groups in the running of 
government, meant that if infractions on the law were discovered, they went unpunished 
(Camacho, 2016). The weakness of Colombia’s state allowed the illicit narcotics trade to flourish 
(Ramírez Lemus, Stanton and Walsh, 2005). For Colombia, this is when the violence began 
(McDougall, 2009). The hold of the narcotics traffickers on the Colombian state was so powerful 
that at one point it was considered to be on the verge of becoming a narco-state. While the 
definition of a narco-state is now contested, a narco-state was defined as a state where narcotics 
traffickers have penetrated and established power within all legitimate initiations in the state 
(Kan, 2016). More specifically, illicit narcotics traffickers had begun to penetrate to positions of 
power, explored in Colombian Institutions and Narcotics Trafficking (Camacho, 2016). 
Camacho argues that the flexibility of narcotics traffickers in Colombia brought them great 
power.  
 
When the Colombian state attempted to reassert control in the period from 1980 to the late 
1990s, the narcotics traffickers often engaged in terrorism such as bombings and assassinations 
in an attempt to prevent their profitable hold on the economy and society from being broken 
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(Harding, 1998). This changed when President Álvaro Uribe began his policies to strengthen 
state power and use the military to enforce law. He aimed to increase the power and stability of 
the state itself, and has been largely successful. The introduction of Plan Colombia, targeted at 
reducing drug cultivation and production in Colombia, has been reasonably successful in 
reducing violence (Mejía, 2016) 
 
A key element in the capacity of the Colombian state to change the dynamic in terms of the 
illegal narcotics industry was its strong, sustained economic performance since at least 2000 
(World Bank, 2017). Colombia’s economy is not as large as Mexico’s, ranked 39th in the world 
by GDP, but it has features that have assisted state stability and the power of the state to act 
against the illegal narcotics industry (World Bank, 2017; Mejía, 2016).  
All these statistics would be relatively meaningless in terms of state stability if they had just 
entrenched wealth inequality and had not improved the quality of life for the majority of the 
population. The impact of solid economic performance has seen GDP per capita rise 
dramatically in Colombia. In 1990, GDP per capita was $1,500 per person. By 2015, it had risen 
to $14,130 per person. This is an increase of over 800% in 25 years (World Bank, 2017). Poverty 
levels have decreased dramatically as well from 65% of the population in 1990 to sub-25% by 
2015 (World Bank, 2017).  
 
Corruption in Colombia is not as deep an issue as it is in Mexico. According to the CPI, 
Columbia is ranked 96th in the world out of 176 states (CPI, 2017). Colombia had a better 
ranking in the fourth lowest percentile with its neighbour and peer states in South America. Its 
score has been steady at around 37, almost at the crossover point to states perceived as less 
corrupt. Its result had remained relatively static since 2012 (CPI, 2017).  
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This evidence is supported by other independent measurements of corruption and governance. 
The World Bank (2018) maintains a database of Worldwide Governance Indicators which 
includes an assessment of perceived corruption, along with a number of other factors, including 
political stability, government effectiveness and regulatory quality.  
Colombia is ranked very poorly in terms of political stability, which is not surprising given that 
the armistice with FARC was only concluded in 2016 (The World Bank, 2017). Yet government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality are all ranked at relatively high, stable levels. Colombia’s 
regulatory quality has actually risen. Control of corruption has also remained steady (The World 
Bank, 2017).  
This paints a positive image or at least consistency in Colombia’s stability achievements, and 
also potential for further steps towards stability.   
This has consolidated state stability and it is an immeasurable advantage in implementing policy 
against the illegal narcotics industry.  
 
Violence has been greatly reduced, and an armistice with the FARC has since been negotiated. A 
peace process was begun in 2010 with Cuba acting as the sponsor. The final armistice was 
signed in November 2016, and homicides began to drop in 2002 (see figure 2.1). This shows that 
the policies concerning drug trafficking had begun to take effect before the final armistice.  
 
The homicide rate has continued to fall, even despite rising levels of cocaine seizures in 
Colombia and for cocaine originating from Colombia (see figure 2.1). This can be attributed to 
the end of aerial fumigation of coca crops along Colombia’s borders, due to concerns over health 
impact on the population, allowing cultivation to be renewed (Ramírez Lemus et al., 2005). 
However, in the last 3 years since this fumigation program has been stopped, the homicide rate 
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has remained low (UNODC, 2018). Colombia has developed from a failing state, to a weak state, 
to a moderately stable state, and this has had a huge effect on violence.  
 
Mexico 
Historically, Mexico has been a much more stable and stronger state than Colombia. Indeed, it is 
still a relatively strong state today. The major issues with state stability in Mexico are the power 
of drug cartels and the steadily increasing homicide rate (Phillips, 2018). This clearly indicates 
that the rise in violence has been due to illicit narcotics trafficking and the state’s unsuccessful 
responses rather than due to the dissolving of state stability followed by the increased power of 
drug cartels (Calderón et al., 2015).  
 
Mexico’s economy is the result of its 70-year authoritarian regime, carefully maintained and 
nurtured, but unexposed to the difficulties that come with managing democratic style politics 
(Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). Corruption abounded relatively unchecked during the 
authoritarian era, but has become far more of a threat to a democratised Mexico. It is this 
corruption that allows narcotics traffickers to exploit the economy and the state to continue their 
operations (Morris, 2012).  
 
These representations may also have underestimated the actual strength of the Mexican 
economy, in which relatively solid headline figures mask weak performance in critical areas 
such as underemployment, impoverished employment and lack of regional employment 
opportunities. Mexico’s economic performance has been mediocre for decades, with a high 
population masking systemic flaws that provide a large workforce pool for crime and drug 
cartels (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016).  
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Mexico’s economy is ranked 15th largest in the world according to the World Bank (2017). It is 
the second largest economy in Latin America after Brazil. Unemployment is measured as low at 
3.2 per cent (World Bank, 2017). However, this masks deep social problems. Underemployment 
in Mexico is 25% and 43.6% of Mexicans live below the national poverty line (World Bank, 
2017).  
 
As many authors on organised crime have previously established, economics is a strong driver 
for individuals to become involved in organised crime. In the case of Latin America, Rosen and 
Zepeda Martínez (2016) make strong arguments that the high levels of inequality and 
unemployment drive individuals to seek work with drug cartels. Combined with the individually 
driven nature of the work economy, many individuals are forced to seek income where it comes.  
 
Another effect of democratisation on the economy was the beginning of revenue and 
employment streams from locations such as the US. With the introduction of NAFTA and 
democracy, there has been far more international interest in Mexico’s economy. Along with this 
comes the ability and sometimes the need for Mexican workers to seek out employment in the 
US (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). This can make them vulnerable while in the US, and 
can lead to the cartels employing family and friends to aid them in narcotics trafficking, as is the 
case with the cartel MS-13, operating across Mexico and the US (Wolf and Logan, 2010).  
 
This also has made it easier for narcotics traffickers and the related business of money 
laundering. More international investment has made it easier to launder money and for drug 
cartels to expand their businesses internationally (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). 
The economy is an important issue but it is by no means the main driver of the current situation 
in Mexico.  
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The fact that the rise in violence in Mexico has been due to the state’s unsuccessful responses to 
illicit narcotics trafficking is also reinforced by looking at patterns of violence in Mexico on a 
province by province basis (Rios Contreras, 2013). As mentioned in the previous chapter, there 
is a clear pattern of location-dependent violence: it is intense in states that are on the border with 
the US, as well as ports that are used to transport drugs overseas. In other areas, the levels of 
violence have remained low (see Figure 2.3). This demonstrates that the power of the Mexican 
state is only failing in key strategic areas for narcotics traffickers (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 
2016; Rios Contreras, 2013). Because this is restricted to key strategic areas, it indicates not that 
the state itself is failing presently, but that narcotics traffickers are exploiting and therefore 
reducing the power of the state in these areas. The weakness of the state is increased because of 
the violence in these areas, and the inability of the state to cope with the increased violence (Rios 
Contreras, 2013).  
 
Mexico’s stability and strength should be highly off-putting to illicit narcotics traffickers. 
However, it has not played out in this way. This is for three important reasons.  
The first is corruption. While Mexico has been a relatively stable state, it has also experienced a 
high level of corruption, from within law enforcement to government employees and judges. 
Corruption makes it easier for narcotics traffickers to operate in a country, especially in turning a 
blind eye to the labour-intensive process of drug refinement and trafficking. The CPI in 2016 
ranked Mexico 123rd of 176 states (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2018). Mexico ranked in the 
third lowest percentile for corruption globally. Its ranking has deteriorated from 35 to 29-30 
since 2012 (CPI, 2017). Importantly, Mexico was ranked as worse for corruption than any other 
South American country with the exception of Venezuela, which is in a state of national 
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economic collapse. Only Russia amongst the Top 20 global economies had a worse ranking for 
corruption perceptions than Mexico (CPI, 2017). 
Mexico has deteriorated sharply over the last 10 years with control of corruption now located in 
the bottom 15 per cent. It has collapsed from almost 50 in 2007 to 15 from 2017 (CPI, 2017). 
There is a correlation between erosion of rule of law and control of corruption in this period. 
 
The second is utility. As stated in the previous chapter, Mexico is perfectly and essentially 
positioned for the illicit narcotics trade. Geographically, it borders one of the world’s highest 
consumers of cocaine, as well as bordering one of the main routes for cocaine from South 
America into the US (Kan, 2016; Andreas, 2000). It has both ports and land borders, enabling 
international distribution (Kan, 2016).  
 
The third reason has been rule of law. This seems to be a counter-productive point, but it is not 
in the context of illicit narcotics trafficking. In order for trafficking and production to operate, it 
requires infrastructure (Kan, 2016). That infrastructure includes water supply, power, sewage 
and irrigation, access to roads and ports, and many other services that are often overlooked when 
considering narcotics trafficking and cultivation (Kan, 2016). Most importantly, this may include 
safety for the farmers who grow the crops, limited law enforcement to ensure that lawlessness 
doesn’t occur. That infrastructure is easiest to exploit when it is maintained by the state but can 
be co-opted for use by narcotics traffickers through corruption.  
 
Another essential reason is that criminals often use rule of law for the same reason citizens do: to 
prevent violence.  
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As Rios Contreras establishes in her paper, there is a complex relation between violence and rule 
of law. She argues that when law enforcement is effective, criminals are less likely to resort to 
violence as the law acts as an insurer of behaviour (Rios Contreras, 2013). When deals occur, 
criminals rely on law enforcement to enforce any infringements on deal making such as the use 
of violence. However, when law enforcement cannot be relied on to deal with violence, 
criminals must find other ways to ensure both parties adhere to deals. Often, the only avenue 
available is violence (Rios Contreras, 2013). This is clearly evident in the Mexican state, where 
the decreased rule of law leads to an increase in violence, which again continues to contribute to 
a decreased rule of law and more violence. It becomes a vicious downwards spiral. 
The reason corruption is highlighted in this context is because of this violence. Because of the 
high levels of corruption, the law cannot be maintained in these areas (Rosen and Zepeda 
Martínez, 2016). 
The chicken and egg spiral of this situation has been spurred on by policy, but is a dangerous 
indicator of the level of corruption in Mexico.  
 
Mexico and Colombia in Comparison 
As can be seen from both Colombia and Mexico, state stability and power has a huge impact on 
the effects of policy. In Colombia, by strengthening the state and increasing stability, the rule of 
law has been applied more consistently and effectively (Iturralde and José Ariza, 2016). This has 
contributed greatly to the continuing drop in violence. In Mexico, the narco-traffickers have 
revealed the weaknesses of the state rather than its strength. It has demonstrated the extent of 
corruption as a pivotal issue in Mexico (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). This corruption has 
contributed to the rising levels of violence, as it has led the state to be unable to enforce the rule 
of law.  
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But this is not the only reason for the decrease in violence in Colombia. There is a geo-political 
element in play with strong economic and military power to influence policy and events. 
 
US influence 
When state stability for Mexico and Colombia is being discussed, it is impossible not to mention 
the US. The US has had a history of intervention in the whole of South America, for better and 
for worse. Since Ronald Reagan began the ‘war on drugs’ in 1986, the stability and strength of 
South and Latin American states in relation to narcotics trafficking has been of great interest to 
the US (Youngers and Rosin, 2005). While the US has historically provided aid to the 
governments in South America, including Colombia and Mexico, this is not always provided 
without caveats (Mejía, 2016). The US encourages these states to deal with narcotics traffickers 
in the same way the US has over the last 20 years: zero-tolerance and imprisonment (see Scott 
and Marshal, 1991; Friedman, 1996). This has had effects on the policy decisions and the 
stability of both the Colombian and Mexican government (see Youngers and Rosin, 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
State stability and strength is an important factor to consider when examining the failure and 
success of illicit narcotics trafficking prevention policies. It both provides the background to why 
these policies are pursued, and is interwoven into their implementation, effects and successes 
(Kan, 2016). This factor provides an important point of distinction between the cases of Mexico 
and Colombia, and serves to aid in explaining why there have been such radically different 
effects on violence. Colombia started from a position of great weakness and instability, and 
strengthened its position massively in order to introduce policy (Mejía, 2016). The weakness of 
the state and the influence of Colombia’s geography was acknowledged when introducing 
policy.  
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Mexico began from what seemed to be a position of strength, but this was not the case on a 
deeper level. Mexico’s issues with corruption and law enforcement combined with geography 
and border politics to set a difficult and dangerous obstacle for policy to overcome (Morris, 
2012).  
These different backgrounds are important, but do not fully explain the opposing effects of 
policy. There is a final factor that, when combined with these factors, caused the rise in violence 
in Mexico and the drop in violence in Colombia.  
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Chapter 4: Policy Orientation 
Introduction 
Underlying factors of geography and state stability that have affected the rise of violence in 
Mexico and Colombia have been explored, but these factors are not causes in themselves. The 
geography of Mexico and Colombia has not changed over the last 15 years, and state stability is 
not an explanation in itself for relative changes in the rates of violence. What remains to be 
examined is the difference in the policy orientations of Colombia and Mexico towards the illegal 
narcotics industry in confronting the violence arising directly from its operations. Policy 
orientation including implementation is the key to understanding why Colombia has achieved a 
massive reduction in the level of violence related to the illegal narcotics sector while Mexico has 
seen violence escalate.  
 
Policy orientation in this chapter refers to the content and focus of the policies introduced by 
Mexico and Colombia including their aims and goals, as well as what occurred in terms of levels 
of violence with the roll-out of specific programs. This chapter will explore the importance of 
policy orientation when combatting illicit narcotics trafficking, the different policy orientations 
taken by Colombia and Mexico, and the way policy orientation is affected by geography and 
state stability. It will also show that the same type of policy that works in one state may not be 
realistic in another state. This is the harsh lesson learned by Mexico when it tried to apply similar 
policies to Colombia without recognising its own unique circumstances as a logistics hub for the 
trafficking of illegal narcotics to the United States as well as a fledgling democracy with 
immature political and judicial institutions that were vulnerable to corruption (Rosen and Zepeda 
Martínez, 2016). 
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Colombia 
Background 
Before evaluating and exploring the approaches that Colombia took in its anti-drug policies, it is 
necessary to explore the background that informed these approaches.  
The civil war with the FARC began in 1963 and by the 1990s the state was rapidly losing ground 
to the FARC, who were inching closer and closer to the capital and the control of Colombia 
(Paul, Serena and Clarke, 2014).  
At the same time, the rise of crack cocaine in America had led to a massive increase in coca 
production and illicit drug trafficking in Colombia. Colombia, in many ways, was the epicentre 
of this trade in Latin America, especially with the power of the Medellin Cartel and the Cali in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Paul, Serena and Clarke, 2014). As in Mexico, the power of and 
proliferation of drug cartels continued to grow and diversify in the 1990s as the monopoly of the 
larger cartels was broken. With this diversification and fracturing came increased turf wars 
between cartels, and increasing violence (Calderón et al., 2015).  Alongside the threat from the 
FARC, Colombia was considered to be a failed state, close to collapsing into a narco-state 
(Camacho, 2016).  
These two situations created a fight for the Colombian states on two fronts, and if both fronts 
were not addressed then the state would not survive. As such, the policies the government 
pursued needed to deal with these two situations simultaneously and with an integrated approach 
(Ramírez Lemus, Stanton & Walsh, 2005). 
Not only that, but the government had to deal with two factors that were already against them: 
geography and state stability. The policies they pursued had to strengthen an almost collapsed 
state, and deal with a challenging geography that made them inherently vulnerable to drug 
trafficking.  
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With this background, the Colombian government decided to pursue policies that were not 
directly linked with law enforcement crackdowns on narcotics traffickers or FARC para-military 
groups. They decided to pursue policies that would attempt to massively strengthen the power 
and stability of the state while at the same time targeting illicit narcotics traffickers under Plan 
Colombia (Mejía, 2016).  
 
Policies 
Termed ‘Plan Colombia’, the policies that the Colombian administration introduced were low 
tolerance policies that used the military and the police to increase state control (National 
Planning Department, 2006). This was aimed not at the central and strong positions in Colombia, 
but at the weak ones – the isolated and rural areas that were often the targets of guerrilla groups 
and narcotics traffickers (National Planning Department, 2006).  
 
The policies targeted two different areas of narcotics trafficking: cultivation and trafficking. To 
target cultivation, there was a focus on the destruction of coca plantations. This involved locating 
and eradicating them by burning, as well as a large-scale aerial fumigation of coca crops. Aerial 
fumigation was a massive success, and required far less manpower than the military locating and 
burning the coca crop on the ground (Mejía, 2016). To target trafficking, strengthening the 
judiciary was essential in order to prosecute crimes effectively, as well as undertaking drug 
seizure operations and targeting cartel employees (Iturralde and José Ariza, 2016). As reported 
in Iturralde and José Ariza (2016), there has been a large increase in the number of extraditions 
for narcotics trafficking, up around 200% since 2000, and a great spike in criminal proceedings 
and convictions.  
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The policies pursued by the Colombian government in this period have generated successes and 
failures, depending on the measures that are used for assessment.  
It can be said that Colombia successfully strengthened the state apparatus (National Planning 
Department, 2006). This can be seen qualitatively in the sustained negotiations for peace with the 
FARC which culminated in a formal ceasefire in 2016, as well as the move away from being 
reduced to the status of a narco-state, as was predicted in the 1990s (Ramírez Lemus et al., 
2005).  
The metric that is quantitative is concerned with the rate of homicide as an indicator of violence. 
According to this metric, the policies pursued by the Colombian government have reduced 
homicides dramatically. As can be seen in Figure 1.2, Colombia has reduced its homicide rate 
from 68.2 per 100,000 people in 2002 to 25.5 in 2016 (UNODC, 2018).  
 
There have been criticisms of this approach. The use of the military resulted in a number of 
reported human rights abuses (Ramírez Lemus et al., 2005). The effects on cocaine production 
have not been a resounding success. Aerial fumigation was successful in destroying coca crops, 
but was banned by the Colombian government in 2015 due to the terrible health-related side-
effects of the pesticides on the local population (Ramírez Lemus et al., 2005; Mejía, 2016). 
Manual eradication was increased in an attempt to pick up any slack from the lack of aerial 
fumigation (Mejía, 2016). Since this, coca exports have actually increased out of Colombia, from 
958.29 tons of cocaine products seized in 2012 to 1448.53 ton in 2016 (UNODC, 2018). 
However, violence has not increased at a similar rate, decreasing from 35.1 per 100000 of the 
population in 2012 to 25.5 in 2016 (see figure 1.2) (UNODC, 2018).  
Overall it can be said, Colombia’s approach has been a success, especially when it comes to 
reducing violence.  
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These policies were a success because they changed the way narcotics trafficking was able to 
operate in Colombia. They addressed both the geography of the region and the importance of 
state stability and power.  
Colombia’s anti-narcotics initiatives have set an example of coordinated policy in action that has 
provided a template for other states to adapt to their own conditions and use in the event that 
they wished to seriously confront narcotics production and trafficking. Mexico is a prime 
example of a state that attempted to take Colombia’s policy template and apply it to their own 
social and national conditions (see Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). The resulting situation in 
Mexico is analysed as the comparative section of this thesis.  
 
Colombia’s set of policy initiatives had some innovative aspects. Decentralisation of state power 
worked to negate the influence of Colombia’s geography. The lack of population density leading 
to areas where there was limited state involvement was overcome by targeting law enforcement 
and military activities to these areas. This restricted the level of isolation that drug cultivation 
requires, and made it more difficult to function. The aerial fumigation program, while it was 
undertaken, also negated the ability of coca growers to grow and harvest their crop (Mejía, 
2016). This created an environment that caused the utility of Colombia’s geography to lessen in 
comparison to Peru and Ecuador for drug cultivation.  
With lower levels of cultivation and production, there was less product to be trafficked out of 
Colombia, making it easier for law enforcement to operate at ports and borders.  
 
This focus on removing the advantage of geography in Colombia was complemented by 
increasing state stability and power. As established in the previous chapter, narcotics trafficking 
is easier in states that are weaker and less stable. It is easier to escape law enforcement when 
corruption is rife making it even easier to operate. At the beginning of 2000, Colombia was weak 
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and unstable. By 2010, Colombia had greatly strengthened the state, increasing the capabilities 
of law enforcement and the justice system, making it easier to create and enforce laws. It also 
targeted corruption, making it harder again for drug traffickers to skirt laws and to skew the 
justice system in their favour, explored in Iturralde and José Ariza (2016), and seen in the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018) and the Corruptions Perception Index (2018). A 
stronger justice system was more likely to convict and uphold sentences, making it harder for 
narcotics traffickers to continue to operate if they were caught (Iturralde and José Ariza, 2016). 
By taking these factors into account when determining the orientation of the policy, Colombia 
was able to reduce violence significantly.  
 
That is not to say there have been downsides to the approach taken by Colombia in its efforts 
against narcotics trafficking, but there has been a clearly positive effect on violence that shows 
the benefits to considering stability and geography when creating policy against narcotics 
trafficking rather than assuming the success of law enforcement. 
 
Mexico  
Background 
Turning to Mexico, which has experienced the opposite trajectory of violence compared to 
Colombia, it is again necessary to look at the history of the nation to understand the rationale for 
its policy decisions so it becomes clear why Mexico’s policy orientation was unsuccessful in 
preventing violence and actually exacerbated this social problem.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Mexico was one of the oldest authoritarian regimes on 
earth until its transition to democracy. It had been a stable authoritarian state for 71 years since 
1929 through the rule of the PRI party (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). As a result, Mexico 
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exhibited some of the basic structural features of an authoritarian state such as a functioning 
economy, relative internal security and peer status with other countries in global institutions. 
Mexico was exceptional in its totally peaceful transition from an authoritarian regime to 
democracy. This transition, once instigated, is considered to have been completed in 2000 with 
the election of President Vicente Fox Quesada (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). However, as 
a newly fledged democracy, issues that had flown under the radar in Mexico’s authoritarian 
government now had to be addressed publicly. One of these issues was the issue of illegal 
narcotics trafficking.  
 
From 1990, Mexico experienced a boom in illegal narcotics trafficking. This was due to the ease 
of transporting narcotics through Mexico as opposed to the Caribbean, and the utility of 
Mexico’s geographical and logistics position in the chain of narcotics trafficking (Youngers and 
Rosin, 2005). The amount of cocaine smuggled across the border continued to increase, along 
with heroin and marijuana. The cartels that operated in Mexico began to become more brazen 
and more powerful as they built their empires (see Calderón et al., 2015).  
The Mexican government was encouraged by the United States, the country that consumes most 
of the illicit narcotics that travel through Mexico, to crack down on drug trafficking and 
traffickers, and to begin to reduce the volume of drugs entering the United States (Youngers and 
Rosin, 2005). With the accession to power of the Calderon administration in 2006 came the start 
of the so-called ‘Mexican War on Drugs’ (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016).  
 
Policies 
The Calderon administration under President Phillipe Calderon called for a law-enforcement 
crackdown on narcotics cultivators and traffickers. This included harsher penalties for narcotics 
trafficking, more seizures and arrests by law enforcement and the use of the ‘kingpin strategy.’ 
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The kingpin strategy was designed to target the leaders and important figures in the operation of 
drug cartels, often called ‘kingpins.’ The goal was to capture or kill as many of these individuals 
as possible to destabilise the leadership of the cartels leading to their collapse. Under the 
presidency of Enrique Pena Nieto from 2012, these policies were deepened with the military 
employed in a strategy based on Colombia, whose policies were already achieving successes. 
However, this did not help the situation in Mexico with homicides only increasing each year, 
along with other levels of crime (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). The violence of the cartels 
also increased, with killings becoming more and more brutal. Decapitation, mutilation of 
individuals and corpses, and many more examples of extreme violence can be found. Violence as 
an intimidation tactic increased, with politicians and journalists commonly targeted. Since 2001, 
there have been an estimated 40 journalists killed in Mexico, as opposed to 25 over the same 
period in Colombia (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2018a; CPJ, 2018b). This is compared to 
Afghanistan where over the same period 45 journalists were killed (CPJ, 2018c). In Afghanistan, 
however, 21 of these were classed as ‘murder’ with 37 of those in Mexico designated the same 
(CPJ, 2018a). Mexico in 2017 was ranked as number 6 on the CPJ’s Impunity Index (Witchel, 
2017), a measure of journalistic safety.  
 
As a result of the deaths and removal of their leadership, the cartels operating in Mexico became 
increasingly violent, mutating from cartels such as the Cali cartel, a hugely powerful but less 
violent cartel, to cartels such as the Los Zetas, who employed military tactics and massive 
bloodshed to intimidate opponents (Grayson, 2014). As the kingpin strategy progressed, the 
hierarchical operations of drug cartels were weakened, leading to greater instability and 
fracturing (Calderón et al., 2015). This was an inadvertent and unexpected outcome of this 
policy which continues to reverberate through Mexico to this day. It has led to open conflict 
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between cartels that leads in turn to retaliatory killings, war over territory and distribution points 
and attempts to overcome other cartels (Lindo and Padilla-Romo, 2018).  
It is important to note, however, that this extreme violence is isolated to certain key strategic 
provinces for narcotics trafficking within Mexico (see Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016, pg. 
43). In some areas, there is extremely limited rule of law.  
The situation in Mexico continues to deteriorate, with 2018 on track to again create new records 
for the number of homicides per year (Associated Press, 2018).  
 
This policy in Mexico is night compared to Colombia’s day. There has been a series of clear 
failures, and the 2018 election was won by President Lopez Obrador on the back of a clear 
platform of dealing with narco-violence and drug reform in a different way (Phillips and Agren, 
2018). The question remains: what was different about this policy in Mexico compared to 
Colombia? 
 
Mexico used a law-enforcement based policy – one that relied on increasing the power of police 
and the judiciary to curb crime and violence (Freeman and Luis Sierra, 2005). This policy 
approach makes a dangerous assumption: that the rise in violence is simple a result of weak law 
enforcement, and that there are not other factors at work. Critically, Mexico did not account for 
either its geography or state stability when developing and deploying this anti-narcotics policy 
and deciding its orientation. It has also not been able to change course and adapt policy when 
there is clear evidence of failure. 
 
Mexico is essential in illicit narcotics trafficking in Latin America. It has become increasingly 
useful for cartels, and increasingly important (Kan, 2016). Given that the weakened and smaller 
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America, they are forced to hold the positions that they have, and lack the power to shift their 
operations outside of Mexico. Not only that, but as discussed in the chapter on geography, 
Mexico is the gateway to the American drug market. The US is the world’s largest consumer of 
cocaine by total volume as well as the third largest consumer of cocaine by head of population, 
and the easiest market to supply due to proximity (UNODC, 2018). Australia and the United 
Kingdom, the first and second largest, are slightly harder to supply, they are smaller markets and 
neither shares a land border with Mexico (UNODC, 2018). This forces the drug cartels into a 
more difficult position than Colombia. As there is nowhere else for them to practically move 
their operations that will serve the same profitable purpose, and they lack the strength to develop 
another location into an area equally as useful, the cartels are more likely to try and get the 
Mexican state to budge by retaliating with violence (Rios Contreras, 2013). This happened 
historically in Colombia when the Colombian government was considering an extradition treaty 
with the United States, and the Cartels in Colombia attempted to strong-arm the government into 
giving ground (Tickner et al., 2016). They did not succeed. But in Mexico, the situation is more 
dire: the Colombian cartels found other ways to operate, whereas the Mexican cartels cannot. By 
simply introducing law enforcement policies, this does not take the effects of Mexico’s 
constrained geography into account.  
 
When using a law enforcement based policy to deal with crime, there are some factors that must 
hold up for the policy to succeed. Not only does the state need the capability to make arrests and 
investigate crimes, but also to take criminals into custody. The state then needs the capability to 
apply the rule of law: to prosecute crimes, and to apply sentences to criminals. In sum, they 
require a law enforcement system, legal system and justice system that all function together and 
work reasonably well. The issue that became apparent in Mexico was that these systems did not 
function together or reasonably well (Rios Contreras, 2013). All were rapidly and rampantly 
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affected by corruption, which reduced their ability to coordinate and operate effectively (Rosen 
and Zepeda Martínez, 2016; WGI, 2018). The cartels in Mexico worked quickly, targeting 
politicians and important political figures and journalists to weaken the state’s control in areas 
important to their operations and distribution. The prison system quickly became overburdened, 
and without proper rehabilitation programs to enter the mainstream economy, many inmates 
turned to the cartels as a last resort to make a livelihood (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). 
 
What followed this was the beginning of a wave of violence, where the inefficiencies in 
Mexico’s system of law allowed cartels to begin to retaliate against the state. This situation has 
escalated rapidly as Mexico continues to follow this law-enforcement based strategy (see 
Calderón et al., 2015; Lindo and Padilla-Romo, 2018). 
This escalation has, in turn, further undermined Mexico’s stability rather than strengthening it. 
Mexico’s policies did not have the ability to maintain the strength and stability of the state 
because they assumed that the state could take the brunt of the narcotics violence and survive 
intact. Perhaps the policy assumptions also underestimated the fragility of Mexico as a relatively 
new democracy since 2003. Its institutions have not had time to mature peacefully but have been 
challenged almost immediately by escalating violence and corruption.  
 
As such, issues with corruption have emerged in all its democratic institutions and the anti-
narcotic policies were not able to adapt to this weakness.  
 
Mexico and Colombia in Comparison 
Both Mexico and Colombia increased the power of the military and the police to combat 
narcotics traffickers, targeted cartels, and introduced more zero-tolerance policies. Despite their 
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overt similarities, the policies pursued by Mexico and Colombia had fundamentally different 
orientations.  
 
Colombia’s policy was geared towards strengthening and stabilising the state while at the same 
time combatting issues with narcotics trafficking (NPD, 2006). This orientation recognised the 
difficulties for the state from its geography, and the attractiveness of this geography to drug 
dealers, while also recognising the weakness of the state and the need for stronger and more 
stable state power. By first strengthening and stabilising the state by dealing with the FARC and 
increasing power in isolated areas, and targeting coca cultivation, Colombia was able to avoid 
collapse if the cartels and narco-traffickers decided to retaliate against the policies (see Ramírez 
Lemus et al., 2005).  
 
Mexico’s policy was geared towards law enforcement and taking on the drug cartels and 
narcotics traffickers (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). This orientation did not attempt to 
boost or maintain the stability and power of the state, which was a new democracy trying to 
establish its institutions and credibility. As a consequence, issues with stability such as 
corruption were revealed, and there was no policy put in place to counter these issues. These 
policies had to be added later, and by that stage stability had already begun to erode. The result 
of the 2018 election in Mexico with its strong focus on finding a new policy towards the 
narcotics trade reflects the desire of Mexicans to deal with this terrible social problem once and 
for all (Phillips and Agren, 2018). It is critical that the new government of President Lopez 
Obrador approach the policy conundrum holistically, realistically and sensitively to Mexico’s 
unique set of circumstances.  
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Conclusion 
Policy orientation is the fundamental factor that has impacted on the differing results of anti-
narcotics trafficking policies in Colombia and Mexico. This chapter has shown that although 
Colombia and Mexico pursued superficially similar policies, there were fundamental differences 
in orientation that affected their success. Colombia’s policies were focussed on increasing the 
capability of the state to enforce law, whereas Mexico’s were designed around law enforcement 
and zero-tolerance for narco-violence. These different policy orientations had radically different 
effects, especially when combined with the other factors of geography and state stability.  
Colombia’s policies were responsive to the challenges posed by their geography and by the 
existing level of power in the state, and were therefore a success. Mexico’s policies did not take 
into account the importance of geography and Mexico’s position of importance to illicit 
narcotics traffickers, and did not realistically consider the weaknesses of the Mexican state due 
to corruption and an underperforming economy. Instead of bolstering the state and cracking 
down on illicit narcotics traffickers, the policies instead revealed these weaknesses and 
exacerbated them (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). Policy orientation is therefore the 
essential difference between Mexico and Colombia, and has contributed greatly to the drop in 
Colombia’s homicide rate and Mexico’s increasing violence and instability. 
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Conclusion 
The issue of criminal violence is a pertinent issue for any state, as the level of criminal violence 
is often indicative of a state’s power and stability, and can be extremely negative in affecting 
both the population and the state. Criminal violence often follows illicit narcotics trafficking 
very closely, especially in Latin and Central America (WDR, 2018). As the world’s principal 
suppliers of cocaine, consistency of supply of illicit narcotics trafficking through this region is of 
extreme importance, and violence has often become an issue in many of the countries on this 
route (WDR, 2018).  
 
Colombia and Mexico are two major countries on this route, and their experience is highly 
pertinent in determining the reasons behind policy failure designed to target illicit narcotics 
trafficking.  
Colombia at the beginning of 2000 was close to collapse, with massive social issues and an 
ongoing 30 year civil war (Harding, 1998). Mexico, on the other hand, had just successfully 
transitioned peacefully to democracy from a 70-year authoritarian regime and was enjoying 
stability and a moderately performing economy (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2013).  
Despite very different circumstances, their policies could not have had more different effects.  
 
Colombia’s state strengthening and illicit narcotics strategies have been a marked success, with 
the homicide rate in Colombia decreasing from 68.3 in 2002 to 25.5 in 2016 since the policies 
were introduced (see figure 1.2). This has followed other successes including a achieving a 
stable economy, enhanced rule of law, an armistice to end the 30-year civil war with the FARC 
paramilitary group and vast improvements in equality and income for its citizens (see Mejía, 
2016).  
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Despite introducing a suite of superficially similar policies designed to curb illicit narcotics 
trafficking, Mexico has not seen the same successes. In the same period in Mexico, the homicide 
rate has increased from a 9.7 in 2002 to a high of 19.3 (see figure 1.3), and is continuing to climb 
(Associated Press, 2018). Corruption has greatly increased, and the strength of the economy has 
been affected, with inequality increasing massively (CPI, 2017; WDI, 2018).  
 
The question is, what has caused similar policies with similar aims to have such different effects 
in two different countries in the same region with similar issues?  
 
The answer comes in three parts, each interacting with the others to affect the extremely different 
outcomes.  
The first dependent factor is geography. The geography and border politics of both states is 
markedly different, with Colombia theoretically able to drive the illegal narcotics industry across 
borders into neighbouring Ecuador and Peru. This has occurred because there is little difference 
for the drug producers and traffickers whether they are located in Colombia or these other states. 
When Colombia applied enough pressure, they simply relocated their operations. Mexico, 
alternatively, is a logistics hub for illegal narcotics trafficking into the US, which is one of the 
world’s biggest markets for coca-based drugs (UNODC, 2018). Narcotics can be transported 
across the land border between these two states or it can use water transportation to either the 
west along the North Pacific Ocean coast or to the east through the Caribbean and the Gulf of 
Mexico. Drop-offs points are varied, numerous and easily replaceable. This means that 
geography is highly important to the drug traffickers operating out of Mexico (Andreas, 2000). It 
is a telling fact that the border provinces of Mexico dominate violence statistics (see figure 2.3). 
There are no viable other options for narcotics trafficking that do not utilise Mexico in some 
way.  
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The second dependent factor is state strength and stability. Colombia and Mexico both had 
radically different starting points in terms of state strength and stability. Colombia was on the 
verge of collapse, either to the paramilitary FARC or to the drug cartels wielding enormous 
power in Colombia (McDougall, 2009). It was apparent that Colombia’s state apparatus was 
weak, and that this would need to be strengthened to counter both of these groups (McDougall, 
2009). Mexico, on the other hand, appeared relatively stable after its peaceful transition to 
democracy with a functioning economy. But, this obscured deep structural issues with the state 
concerning corruption and inequality (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016; Morris, 2012). These 
factors were not addressed as they did not appear to be as debilitating as in Colombia. However, 
they would still work to affect any law-enforcement and judicial operations. Without 
understanding these issues in state stability, it is impossible to understand why Mexico’s policies 
failed to take hold.  
 
The third and independent factor is policy orientation. The major difference between Colombia 
and Mexico has been in their policy orientations, and whether they responded coherently to their 
individual conditions. They have employed similar policies, but in markedly different ways. 
Colombia’s state-strengthening aspects have succeeded in strengthening the state and therefore 
making it easier to perform the illicit narcotics trafficking policies and reduce violence (see 
Borda, 2016; Camacho, 2016; Ticknet et al., 2016). This orientation ensured that Colombia’s 
weak state was able to cope with the potential backlash from the narcotics traffickers, as well as 
taking into account Colombia’s ongoing role in illicit narcotics cultivation. The sparse and 
difficult terrain that made Colombia perfect for narcotics cultivation was addressed directly by 
decentralisation, by ensuring that rural areas were not neglected by military and law enforcement 
and by harassing coca producers with direct crop attacks by air (Tickner et al., 2016). As their 
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orientation was state stability and their policies were responsive to geography, Colombia 
achieved success with their policies.  
 
Mexico’s policy orientation was law enforcement, and this policy orientation could not succeed 
in Mexico due to the geography and border politics, and the frailer stability and strength of 
Mexico. By choosing this approach, relying heavily on existing state strength to push back 
against any rises in violence, as well as rises in arrests, prosecutions and imprisonments brought 
by zero-tolerance, Mexico set itself up for failure. As its policy orientation lacked state-
strengthening, state stability was actually undermined (Rosen and Zepeda Martínez, 2016). As 
the extremely difficult geographical situation of Mexico as a diverse and flexible logistics node 
for drug trafficking was not specifically addressed, policy responses lacked the nuance and 
targeted approach to succeed. Even as the state struggled with violence, Mexico’s position as a 
narcotics distributer changed the utility of violence, making narcotics traffickers more likely to 
rebel against the policies (Rios Contreras, 2013). Beyond this, Mexico did not have the type of 
stability required by law enforcement policy orientations. Burdened with crippling corruption, an 
inefficient justice system and an ineffective penitentiary system, the policy orientation only 
revealed the existing flaws in Mexico’s state power (Morris, 2012).  
 
There are many avenues for future research in this area, as it is highly underdeveloped in 
English-language literature. Of particular importance would be exploring the states of Central 
America and their policy orientations, state stability and geographies. While Colombia and 
Mexico are often foci of studies, and the violence in those countries is high, Central America has 
also been crippled by illicit narcotics trafficking. These countries suffer from the same 
geographic issues as Mexico, as they form a chain through which narcotics are trafficked with no 
other state alternatives to be shifted to. There may be similar issues in state stability as 
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Colombia, and this region is ripe for research in this area. As Colombia has been touted as a 
model policy to pursue elsewhere, it is important to explore this so that the same failures as in 
Mexico are not repeated elsewhere.  
Further research could also be undertaken into how to amend Mexico’s policy approach so that it 
could have a greater impact in the fight against illegal narcotics production and trafficking.  
All the research areas would yield important new responses to the vexed topic of illegal narcotics 
production and trafficking and the violence that is associated with it. 
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